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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
MEADOW SPRINGS, LLC, ) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
) Civil Action No.: 2007CVl43869 
) 
) 
) 
IH RIVERDALE, LLC and GEOFFREY 
NOLAN, 
Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
FILED IN OfF'CEj', 
JAN 1 ;j, 2008 
v. ~~""Wo!.co~ 
McCHESNEY CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC, 
GEORGE McCHESNEY and NICK 
WALLDORFF 
Third-Party Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On December 20,2007, counsel appeared before the Court to present oral 
arguments on cross motions for summary judgment. After reviewing the record of the 
case, the briefs submitted on the motions, and the arguments presented by counsel, the 
Court finds as follows: 
I. FACTS 
This case was originally filed in Fulton County State Court and was transferred on 
November 13, 2007, by an order of State Court Judge Susan B. Forsling. The case was 
then assigned to Judge Elizabeth Long in the Fulton County Superior Court Business 
Case Division because it is related to several other cases before Judge Long. 
IH Riverdale, LLC ("IH") and Geoffrey Nolan, Defendants in this case, filed a 
complaint and a lis pendens in August, 2003, in a related case, IH Riverdale, LLC and 
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Geoffry Nolan v. McChesney Capital Partners, LLC, et aI., civil action number 
2003CV73603 (the "Main Case"). In response, Meadow Springs, LLC, ("Meadow 
Springs") filed this lawsuit alleging slander of title and tortuous interference and seeking 
damages related thereto. 
In January, 2001, McChesney Capital Partners, LLC ("MCP"), entered into an 
agreement to purchase (the "Purchase Agreement") a tract ofland for development 
("Phase I") from G&I Development Company, LLC ("G&I"). The Purchase Agreement 
also stated that at closing G&I would grant MCP an option (the "Option") to purchase an 
additional adjacent tract ofland (the "Phase II" property). On April 19, 2001, MCP 
assigned 50% of its interests in the Purchase Agreement to ''Nolan or IH Riverdale, LLC" 
(the "Assignment"), including the Option. The terms ofIHlNolan's interests in the 
Option were to be defined in an operating agreement to be entered into at a later time. 
Riverdale Capital Investments, LLC ("RCI") was created to acquire and develop 
Phase 1. In order for the Phase I property to be acquired in accordance with IRS § 1031 
tax-deferred exchange regulations, MCP transferred its right to purchase Phase I to 
Qualified Exchange Accommodations LLC, who acted as an intermediary in the 
transaction, and directed that the property be conveyed to RCI. l On June 13, 2001, RCI 
closed the Purchase Agreement with G&I and developed Phase 1. Pursuant to the 
Purchase Agreement, after the Phase I closing, G&I and MCP executed an option 
agreement for Phase II. The terms ofIHlNolan's participation in the Option were defined 
in RCI's Amended Operating Agreement, granting IHlNo1an, among other things, a right 
of first refusal (the "Right of First Refusal") to invest in the Option. 
1 Jeb Beardsley, an attorney, advised MCP on the structure of this transaction and the other § 1031 
transfers involved here. 
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In 2003, Meadow Springs was created to acquire and develop Phase II. After an 
assignment from MCP, Meadow Springs exercised the Option through a § 1 031 tax-
deferred exchange.2 On April 4, 2003, Meadow Springs closed the Phase II property and 
began development. 
In order to finance construction, Meadow Springs obtained a short-term $1.5 
million loan from Michael McChesney (the "McChesney Loan") while it sought long-
term financing. In August, 2003, Meadow Springs was in the process of closing a multi-
million dollar construction loan from Regions Bank, when IH and Nolan filed the 
complaint and lis pendens in the Main Case. IHlNolan claimed that they were prevented 
from exercising their Right of First Refusal to participate in the Option and filed suit in 
the Main Case to enforce their rights. The following day a copy ofthe complaint and the 
lis pendens was delivered to Regions Ban1e 
The Regions Bank loan did not close and Meadow Springs subsequently defaulted 
on the McChesney Loan. Thereafter, Michael McChesney foreclosed on the Phase II 
property and purchased it through foreclosure proceedings. 
As a result of the lis pendens in the Main Case, and the title objection it created, 
Meadow Springs brought this action against IH and Nolan alleging slander of title and 
tortuous interference. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must 
demonstrate that ''there is no genuine issue of material facts, viewed in the light most 
favorable" to the non-moving party, ''to warrant jUdgment as a matter oflaw." Lau's 
2 Again, MCP's attorney structured the transfer, and at the time was president of Meadow Springs. 
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Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (1991). See also, Danforth v. Bullman, 276 Ga. 531, 532 
(2005). 
When Defendants filed their complaint in the Main Case they also filed a lis 
pendens in accordance with O.C.G.A. §§ 23-1-18 and 44-14-610. The purpose ofa lis 
pendens is to put potential purchasers and persons who are not parties to a pending suit 
on notice that a lawsuit involving the realty has been filed. Aiken v. Citizens & S. Bank, 
249 Ga. 481 (1982). 
In order for a lis pendens to be valid, the real property in question must be 
"involved" in the lawsuit. Colony Bank Southeast v. Brown, 275 Ga App. 807 (2005); 
see also, Jay Jenkins Co. v. Financial Planning Dynamics Inc., 256 Ga. 39 (1986). 
Plaintiff argues that, under Georgia law, an unvested (e.g., unexercised or insufficiently 
exercised) option holds no legal or equitable interest in the real property. General 
Electric Co. v. Lowe's Home Centers. Inc., 279 Ga. 77, 79 (2005); Martin v. Schindley, 
264 Ga. 142 (1994). The Right of First Refusal ofthe Option was not exercised by 
IHlNolan. Plaintiff, therefore, contends that the Main Case does not "involve" real 
property within the meaning of the lis pendens statute, that the lis pendens should not 
have been filed, and that in doing so Defendants caused it harm. Plaintiff also argues that 
IHlNolan's claims to impose a constructive trust on Phase II is neither a proper basis for 
filing a lis pendens, nor an appropriate remedy since Defendants had no title to or interest 
in the property. The claim for specific performance of the Option must fail because 
IHlNolan never exercised the Option, or never tendered the purchase price. 
In Colony Bank, the Court of Appeals upheld a trial court's refusal to cancel a lis 
pendens on property for which a party sought the equitable relief to restore the land to its 
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original condition and to install appropriate water flow measures. Title to the property 
was not involved. Colony Bank, 275 Ga. App. at 808. The Supreme Court found in 
Scroggins v. Edmundson, 250 Ga. 430 (1982), that a lis pendens was proper since, ifthe 
plaintiff ultimately prevails, a trust or lien will imposed on the property. Id. at 433. 
Whether or not IHlNolan was prevented from exercising the Right of First 
Refusal ofthe Option or whether it failed to timely exercise it, are questions that remain 
unresolved in the Main Case.3 This Court cannot preclude IHlNolan from protecting its 
potential interests in Phase II simply because their rights with regard to the property have 
not yet been determined. IHlNolan filed suit to enforce their alleged rights in the Phase II 
interests and simultaneously filed a lis pendens to protect the potential interest "involved" 
in the property. The Court finds the filing of the lis pendens to be appropriate. 
The allegations and averments contained in pleadings filed in a court case are 
absolutely privileged. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-8. Thus, the statements in the complaint and the 
lis pendens in the Main Case are privileged under this statute, and cannot give rise to 
slander of title or tortious interference, unless IHlNolan's sending ofthe documents to 
Regions Bank exceeded the boundaries ofthe privilege. See, Panfel v. Boyd, 187 Ga. 
App. 639 (1988). 
In O'Neal v. Home Town Bank, 237 Ga. App. 325 (1999), the Court of Appeals 
refused to apply the absolute privilege to a letter sent to a bank's 900 shareholders 
containing quotations from a verified pleading. The Court held that the letter itself was 
not a pleading, and thus could only qualify for the conditional privilege found in 
O.C.G.A. § 55-5-7. Id. at 331-332. 
3 In IH Riverdale, LLC v. McCheney Capital Partners, LLC, 280 Ga. App. 9 (2006), the Court of Appeals 
reversed, in part, the trial court's grant of summary judgment to MCP and reserved questions ofIHlNolan's 
Option for a jury. 
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Here, unlike O'Neal, rather than quoting portions of the pleadings, the actual 
documents were enclosed. The purpose of a lis pendens is to put third parties on notice 
of a lawsuit. It would seem nonsensical to attach liability for publication of the very 
notice that the lis pendens statute establishes. This Court finds that this publication does 
not exceed the boundaries of the absolute privilege established in O.C.G.A. § 51-5-8. 
Summary Judgment is GRANTED to Defendants. This ruling necessitates the 
DENIAL of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
P4. 
SO ORDERED this 15 day of---="~ ___ ---F_' 2008. 
cc: 
David Pardue, Esq. 
Kristin A. Yadlosky, Esq. 
HARTMAN, SIMONS, SPIELMAN & WOODS LLP 
6400 Powers Ferry Road, NW, Suite 400 
Atlanta, GA 30339 
David L. Rusnak, Esq. 
245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE 
2800 Marquis One Tower 
Atlanta, GA 30303 
Jennifer B. Grippa, Esq. 
Miller & Martin, PLLC 
1170 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 800 
Atlanta, GA 30309 
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